ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 35
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
35-2A. Disparate-impact discrimination
To establish disparate-impact discrimination, a plaintiff must first identify the challenged
employment practice. Second, the plaintiff must show a disparate impact on a group
characteristic, such as race, that falls under Title VII. Third, the plaintiff must show that the
practice caused the disparate impact. To defend its practice, a defendant may attack the
plaintiff’s case by asserting, for example, that the alleged policy does not exist, that it has no
B-2 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 35
35-4A. Religious discrimination
The court found in favor of Tiano, holding, among other things, that she established a prima
facie case of religious discrimination. The court awarded Tiano lost wages for the time she was
unemployed. Dillard’s appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
reversed the judgment of the lower court. The appellate court held that Tiano did not establish a
prima facie case of religious discrimination. “The evidence shows only a bona fide religious
35-5A. Discrimination based on disability
The court granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed this judgment. Murphy appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court applied its holding in Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 219, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), to conclude that
Murphy was not disabled under the ADA. The Court also concluded that Murphy was not
“regarded as” disabled because of his high blood pressure. The Court explained that this would
have been the case if UPS mistakenly believed that his “actual, nonlimiting impairment
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 35 B-3
35-6A. Discrimination based on disability
The court ordered PGA to permit Martin to use a cart. PGA appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the order of the lower court. PGA appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling that a golf cart is
35-7A. Discrimination based on race
The court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the lower court before rehearing the case,
reversing this ruling, and remanding for the entry of a judgment in the defendants’ favor. The
elements of a prima facie case are: a plaintiff must show (1) that he or she is a member of a
protected group; (2) that he or she was qualified and applied for a position or a promotion for
which an employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite the plaintiff’s qualifications, he or
she was rejected; and (4) that a person with similar qualifications who was not a member of a
35-8A. Discrimination based on age
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agreed with the employees, and invited
B-4 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 35
Employment Act (ADEA) does not prohibit favoring the old over the young. The Supreme Court
cited the ADEA’s “text, structure, purpose, and history.” The history “reflects the common facts
35-9A. Discrimination based on gender
The reviewing court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the director of operations’ alleged requirements that hotel
front desk workers be pretty and have a Midwestern girl look were because the worker was a
1. A plaintiff alleging discrimination based on a disability under the ADA must
establish (1) that the plaintiff has a disability; (2) that he or she is qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that he or she
was excluded from the job due to the disability. The court held that Chalfant established his
case. As for the first element, the ADA defines disability in part as “being regarded” as having
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of [an] individual.” In this case, the court concluded that Titan regarded Chalfant as disabled
because it believed that his heart disease and arthritis “substantially limited” his ability to work in
a broad range of jobs, even though this was a mistaken belief. Chalfant wrote on his application
that he considered himself physically handicapped: “Titan therefore knew about the ailments.”
Whether Titan believed that Chalfant's impairments substantially restricted his ability to work in a
broad range of jobs, the court noted that the job of a second shift supervisor is classified as
having “light to medium strength demands,” which is a requirement for the performance of most
jobs. Thus, “a reasonable jury could have found that Titan did not believe that a person with
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 35 B-5
2. A jury awarded Chalfant $60,000 in back pay and $100,000 in punitive damages.
The court added $18,750 in front pay. Titan appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s awards. The appellate court found “sufficient evidence
to show that Titan acted with malice or reckless indifference in its decision not to hire Chalfant.”
Most critical was “Titan's inconsistent behavior at the time of the decision and its inability to